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AI AgentHigh

OpenClaw 1-Click Remote Code Execution

Occurred
Feb 1, 2026
Published
Unknown
Source
MITRE ATLAS
Sector
exercise

Summary

A security researcher demonstrated a 1-click remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability to the OpenClaw AI Agent via a malicious link containing a JavaScript script that only takes milliseconds to execute. This vulnerability has been reported and is being tracked to versions of OpenClaw as CVE-2026-25253. [<sup>\[1\]</sup>][1] OpenClaw “is a personal AI assistant you run on your own devices. It answers you on the chat apps you already use. Unlike SaaS assistants where your data lives on someone else’s servers, OpenClaw runs where you choose – laptop, homelab, or VPS. Your infrastructure. Your keys. Your data.” [<sup>\[2\]</sup>][2] The researcher demonstrated that when the victim clicks a malicious link, a client-side JavaScript script is executed on the victim’s browser that can steal authentication tokens from the OpenClaw control interface via a WebSocket connection. It then uses Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking to bypass localhost restrictions to the OpenClaw Gateway API. Once the connection was established, it uses the stolen token to authenticate and modify the OpenClaw agent configuration to disable user confirmation and escape the container, allowing shell commands to be run directly on the host machine. [1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25253 [2]: https://openclaw.ai/blog/introducing-openclaw Target: OpenClaw Actor: DepthFirst Procedure: 1. The researcher developed a 1-Click RCE JavaScript script. 2. The researcher staged the malicious script at an inconspicuous website. 3. When the victim clicked the link to the researchers’ website, the malicious JavaScript script executes in the user’s browser. 4. The malicious script opened a background window to the victim’s OpenClaw control interface with the `gatewayUrl` set to a WebSocket address on the researcher’s server. OpenClaw’s control interface trusts the `gatewayUrl` query string without validation and auto-connects on load, sending the Gateway token to the researcher’s server. 5. The malicious script performed Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) to bypass localhost network restrictions. It opened a new WebSocket connection to the OpenClaw Gateway server on localhost. 6. The malicious script used the stolen Gateway token to authenticate, allowing subsequent calls to OpenClaw’s Gateway API on the victim’s system. 7. The malicious script disabled OpenClaw’s security feature that prompts users before running potentially dangerous commands. This was done by sending the following payload to OpenClaw’s Gateway API: ``` { "method": "exec.approvals.set", "params": { "defaults": { "security": "full", "ask": "off" } } } ``` 8. The malicious script disabled OpenClaw’s sandboxing, forcing the agent to run commands directly on the host machine instead of inside a docker container. This was done by sending a `config.patch` request to OpenClaw’s Gateway API to set `tools.exec.host` to "gateway".

Deployers

  • OpenClaw

Tags

  • MITRE ATLAS
  • AML.CS0050

Classification

Category confidence: 90%
Severity confidence: 85%

Rationale: AI agent vulnerability enables remote code execution and container escape, posing significant security risk.

Classifier: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-FP8

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