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The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense

Occurred
Mar 24, 2026
Published
Mar 24, 2026
Source
arXiv

Summary

Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Sentinel, a cloud-based Deep Planner, and a deterministic Guard that enforces execution-time policies. Across 1,000 adversarial samples, edge-only defenses fail to detect 86.9% of semantic attacks. In contrast, the full hybrid architecture reduces the overall attack success rate (ASR) to below 1% (0.88% under static evaluation and 0.67% under adaptive evaluation), while maintaining deterministic constraints on side-effecting actions. By filtering presentation-layer attacks locally, the system avoids unnecessary cloud inference and achieves an approximately 17,000x latency advantage over cloud-only baselines. These results indicate that deterministic enforcement at the execution boundary can complement probabilistic language models, and that split-compute provides a practical foundation for securing interactive LLM agents.

Classification

Category confidence: 90%
Severity confidence: 95%

Rationale: Research paper proposing a defense against prompt injection in LLM agents without reporting a concrete incident.

Classifier: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-FP8

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