ASPIRE: Agentic Safety & Prompt Injection Red-teaming Engine
- Occurred
- Oct 6, 2026
- Published
- Oct 6, 2026
- Source
- arXiv
Summary
LLM agents retrieve untrusted content and act through tools, creating indirect prompt-injection risks that can cause unauthorized actions or persistent state changes. Existing automated red-teaming largely optimizes payloads for pre-specified scenarios, leaving latent vulnerabilities across the agent's behavior space unexplored. We present ASPIRE, an Agentic Safety & Prompt Injection Red-teaming Engine for open-ended, behavior-level vulnerability discovery. ASPIRE maintains an evolving Agent Security Behavior Graph and uses complementary Explore and Exploit experts to discover, verify, and generalize consequence-centric tests. Trajectory evidence updates the graph and diagnoses partial or failed attempts, while cross-run memory transfers useful red-team strategies. Experiments on various benchmarks show that ASPIRE substantially expands coverage across consequences, injection methods, environments, and behavior paths while maintaining strong attack success.
Classification
Rationale: Research paper proposing a red-teaming engine for LLM agents, no actual incident or harm reported.
Classifier: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-FP8