Threat Actor Uses a DeepSeek-Powered Hermes Agent in Langflow and n8n Exploitation Attempts
- Occurred
- May 7, 2026
- Published
- Unknown
- Source
- MITRE ATLAS
- Sector
- incident
Summary
A Chinese-speaking threat actor operating as knaithe or KnYuan configured Hermes Agent to use DeepSeek as its reasoning engine. Hermes supplied terminal access, Telegram-based operator control, and a skills system containing both bundled and actor-created red-team skills. The actor also integrated an MCP server that exposed FOFA search, query translation, and Nuclei scan-generation capabilities. Unit 42 recovered a detailed Hermes Agent session dated May 7, 2026. The actor supplied an initial task through Telegram, but Unit 42 recovered no additional operator input during the session. The DeepSeek-powered Hermes Agent then autonomously searched for targets, obtained public exploits, ran scans, evaluated the results, and revised its approach. The agent initially targeted Langflow using a public exploit for CVE-2026-33017. After determining that available targets lacked the exploit's prerequisites, it abandoned that path, compared vulnerabilities across 10 product families, and selected n8n based on apparent severity, exposure, and exploitability. It then obtained a public exploit chain for CVE-2026-21858 and CVE-2025-68613 and probed candidate systems identified through FOFA. Although several systems appeared to run affected versions, the agent found that they lacked the required unauthenticated file-upload functionality. None of the autonomous exploitation attempts obtained access. Separate workspace evidence documented manual actor activity involving Citrix NetScaler data extraction, Marimo command execution, and reverse-shell attempts against Tomcat and IKE VPN systems. Unit 42 obtained this visibility after Hermes Agent responded to a Telegram command by starting an HTTP file server from the actor's home directory, `/home/worker`, instead of an isolated staging directory. This unintentionally exposed the actor's workspace, including AI tool configurations, API keys, exploit scripts, target lists, Bash history, and autonomous exploitation session logs. Target: Publicly exposed Langflow and n8n systems, primarily in China Actor: Chinese-speaking threat actor using the aliases knaithe and KnYuan Reporter: Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 Procedure: 1. The actor obtained access to several generative-AI models and services while evaluating an operational toolset. DeepSeek was selected as the primary reasoning engine for the autonomous attack activity. 2. The actor obtained and configured Hermes Agent as the offensive framework, together with scripts and conventional scanning and exploitation utilities. Hermes provided terminal access, Telegram-based operator control, and a skills system. 3. The actor obtained agent-specific capabilities, including Hermes's framework-bundled godmode skill and the open-source FofaMap MCP server. The MCP server exposed FOFA asset search, natural-language query translation, and Nuclei scan generation to DeepSeek. Unit 42 does not establish that godmode was invoked during the recovered session. 4. The actor created two Hermes skills. web-terminal-exploitation encoded a procedure for unauthenticated WebSocket exploitation, while fofa-cyberspace-search instructed DeepSeek to use the actor's fofoapi.py script for internet asset enumeration. The observed FOFA workflow is consistent with the latter skill; the report does not attribute an action in the recovered session to web-terminal-exploitation. 5. Hermes accessed DeepSeek through its native API and used the model for vulnerability assessment, target selection, command generation, and operational decisions. 6. After receiving an initial task, DeepSeek sequenced reconnaissance and exploitation actions, evaluated failed prerequisites, abandoned Langflow, compared alternative products and vulnerabilities, and selected n8n. Unit 42 recovered no additional operator input during the session. 7. DeepSeek generated FOFA queries, shell commands, scanner invocations, and direct HTTP probes based on the results returned during the session. 8. DeepSeek investigated Langflow, determined what information and prerequisites were needed, and selected follow-on reconnaissance based on returned results.
Deployers
- Publicly exposed Langflow and n8n systems, primarily in China
Tags
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.CS0070
- agent-fail:tool-selection
- agent-fail:planning
- agent-cause:adversarial-input
Classification
Rationale: Autonomous AI agent used by threat actor to conduct multi-step cyber exploitation attempts with tool use and planning.
Classifier: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-FP8