Appreciation Teaches Unauthorized Execution: Self-Evolution Degrades the Robustness of Personal Agents to Indirect Prompt Injection
- Occurred
- Oct 29, 2026
- Published
- Oct 29, 2026
- Source
- arXiv
Summary
Self-evolving personal agents act for users and learn from user feedback. However, if an agent obeys an instruction that an untrusted third party hides in content, the third party gains control of the agent. Such indirect prompt injection (IPI) poses severe risks. We investigate whether self-evolution degrades the robustness of personal agents to IPI. To study this question, we design a controlled two-phase methodology. In the adaptation phase, the user asks the agent to read external content and complete the task described in it, a common request in daily use. The agent then learns from the user's feedback and improves itself as designed. In the test phase, a third party writes a similar task into new external content, but the user's test request does not authorize the injected task. Using this methodology, we build multiple tasks with diverse test instances in different domains for a real personal agent. Our extensive experiments reveal that self-evolution substantially degrades robustness to IPI. Specifically, compared with the base agent, which does not evolve from user feedback, the average attack success rate rises by 14.0--48.8 percentage points under skill evolution and by 3.0--39.3 percentage points under reinforcement learning, posing safety risks. The code is available at https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/Evolve-IPI
Likely agent failure (automated tag)
- Indirect prompt injection
Likely cause (automated tag)
- Model capability limitation
Automated classification
Classifier note (automated): Research paper on self-evolving agents becoming vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks.
Classifier: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-FP8